The integration of the United States into the international decision-making process was gradually realised during the first quarter of the 20th century, particularly after 1917. This carefully orchestrated entry, aimed at embedding American ideals at the core of global political processes, was designed to augment the political weight of the United States, which had been preparing for this role over the preceding decades.
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the American political debate surrounding the form and substance of its involvement in international relations gave rise to two major schools of thought. The first, grounded in the belief that the United States had attained a certain democratic perfection, argued that America was uniquely positioned to serve as a beacon of democracy in the world. This school contended that America’s role on the global stage should be one of exemplary leadership.
The second school of thought, while in agreement on the necessity of promoting American values, viewed the “democratisation of humanity” as an American duty—akin to a modern-day Crusade—and argued that the United States should impose its democratic order on the rest of the world. Both schools shared a common commitment to the exportation of American values, differing only in their approach: whether by imposition or by offering those values through persuasion and attraction.
It was Woodrow Wilson, however, who truly elevated America to the forefront of international diplomacy, justifying the U.S. entry into the First World War not solely in response to German provocations, such as the encouragement of Mexico to attack the U.S. or the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare, but also by asserting that without American participation, the United States would lose its voice in the shaping of international affairs.
The first significant confrontation between European and American diplomacy took place at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where American political thought was articulated through Wilson’s Fourteen Points—an ambitious vision for reimagining international relations. As Henry Kissinger observes in the preface to Diplomacy, Wilson was essentially telling the Europeans that the international order should no longer be based on a balance of power but instead on the principle of national self-determination, which would ensure security through collective means rather than military alliances, and that diplomacy should no longer be conducted in secret.
Three of Wilson’s Fourteen Points directly addressed the issue of national self-determination, with a further three points related to it in more indirect terms. The twelfth point, specifically addressing the Ottoman Empire and thus the Armenian question, read: “For the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire, the security of sovereign autonomy should be guaranteed, while the other nationalities now under Turkish rule must have their rights to life, security, and uninterrupted opportunities for autonomous development safeguarded. The Dardanelles should remain open, under international guarantees, to the free passage of ships and trade for all nations.”
The apex of Wilson’s vision for the reform of international relations was his proposal for the establishment of the League of Nations in his Fourteenth Point.
This extensive introduction serves to briefly reflect on the state of international relations of the time, the role that American involvement played within that framework, and the impact it had on the Armenian cause.
Much has been written about the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920, its articles 88–93, and Wilson’s arbitration decision on 22 November 1920 that ensured their implementation. However, this article will not dwell on these historical facts but rather examine their enduring influence on American policy towards Armenia and Turkey. This influence, on one hand, often creates illusions for the Armenians, and on the other, has the potential to become a source of anxiety for Turkey. In truth, while Wilson’s efforts concerning Armenia were sincere, American policy toward Turkey—especially with regard to the Armenian question—has always carried a pragmatic political undertone.
The United States, despite its ambitious attempts to reform international relations, fully grasps the fundamental nature and logic of international politics, which, one might argue, has not undergone significant change since the Peace of Westphalia in the mid-17th century, one of the most important milestones in European political thought. It was through the Westphalian system that the modern nation-state was established, a concept championed by Wilson himself. However, when we return to the essence of Westphalian international relations, we find that the core principles of international politics are based on ideas such as the balance of power and the mechanisms of deterrence.
It is important to note that these principles are not only expressed on the global stage but also have relevance to the regional and even local levels. Political science typically regards political processes at three levels: global, glocal (a term signifying the convergence of global and local dynamics), and local.
For instance, at the local level, one of the most critical components of any state’s constitution is the establishment of a balance of power among its branches of government, ensuring the proper functioning of the state apparatus. Similarly, on both the regional and global levels, the principles of balance of power operate with similar consequences. In this context, Kissinger’s insights are especially relevant, for he notes that the ambitions of the more aggressive powers within the international community are often tempered by the collective response of countervailing forces, which result from the natural operation of the balance of power.
The purpose of this discussion is to lay a methodological foundation for assessing Turkey’s regional and geopolitical ambitions, and the actions of the United States in curbing its unchecked expansion. However, before turning to this, it is crucial to consider the historical context.
It is unnecessary to focus on the fact that Kemalist Turkey refused to recognise the Treaty of Sèvres, later attempting to efface it through the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that American policy on this issue remained somewhat ambiguous, and it is worth considering several aspects:
- The U.S. President took responsibility for resolving the boundary disputes between Armenia and Turkey through the arbitration decision.
- Prior to this, on 23 April 1920, the United States recognised the independence of the Republic of Armenia.
- Though the U.S. participated as an observer at the Lausanne Conference, it signed a bilateral treaty with Turkey on 6 August 1923 to normalise diplomatic relations. This treaty, however, required ratification by the American Senate. On 18 January 1927, the Senate rejected the treaty, citing concerns over the treatment of Armenians and the incompatibility of the Lausanne Treaty with U.S. law, particularly with respect to Wilson’s arbitration decision. The New York Times published a detailed account of the Senate debates, shedding light on the discussions. Subsequently, in order to resolve the impasse, American-Turkish diplomatic relations were restored through a separate bilateral agreement signed in mid-February 1927.
- The most significant issue in U.S.-Turkish relations from the Armenian perspective, however, was the recognition of Turkey’s de facto eastern borders, a matter which was to be settled by the agreement of 6 August, but which ultimately failed to be ratified due to the Senate’s rejection. During the debates in Congress, Senator William Henry King of Utah was particularly outspoken in his criticism, highlighting the contradictions between the proposed treaty and Wilson’s arbitration decision, as well as the treatment of Armenians and the American commitment to their cause.
- After 1927, the U.S. Congress did not revisit the question of Turkey’s de facto territorial sovereignty.
It is also worth noting that the rejection of the American-Turkish treaty in January 1927 was heavily influenced by the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA), led by Vahan Kartashian. Established in 1919, this committee included 75 prominent figures, including three former presidential candidates, eight ambassadors, 25 governors, and university presidents, among others. This group, alongside the earlier-established “Press Bureau,” became a pivotal force in shaping the political activities of the Armenian diaspora in the United States during this period.
Turning back to U.S.-Turkish relations and the Armenian issue, contemporary Turkey is known for its assertive foreign policy, seeking to extend its influence across the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and the Caucasus. Its expansionist agenda, bolstered by its strategic position within NATO and its involvement in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, has only increased its geopolitical importance.
The United States, as a primary global actor, fully appreciates the importance of regional stability and the need for restraint in the face of aggressive expansion. As Kissinger aptly notes, the ambitions of more belligerent members of the international community can often be counterbalanced by other forces, particularly when the balance of power remains intact.
Given Turkey’s expanding regional ambitions, it is becoming increasingly clear that measures must eventually be taken to contain its expansionism. The international community, especially the United States, possesses several tools to address this challenge, including the Armenian question. It is conceivable that the U.S. may seek to leverage the Armenian cause as a means of counterbalancing Turkish ambitions. However, Armenia must remain prepared to seize international opportunities, as it did in the early 1990s, while also learning from past failures.
Main source: horizonweekly.ca