Vahe Hovhannisyan, member of the Alternative Projects group, spoke to Ara Ayvazyan, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia and founding member of the Pan-Armenian Council of Diplomats. We present him below:
‘ V. H. – You became Foreign Minister a few days after 9 November 2020, in the most difficult and uncertain days in our country’s history. I suggest we start our conversation from those days. Was there any possibility of strategic calculation or planning, or was the work done on a day-to-day basis? What was the shock in the diplomatic corps, how difficult it was to realise that you are the foreign minister of a defeated state, but that you are obliged to continue working with the attitude of an unconquered state. Looking back, what were your personal priorities?
A.A. – First of all, it should be noted that our public institutions were not prepared for the impending catastrophe, if I may put it that way. A fundamental impression was created, as if the whole world knew about the impending war, with the exception of Armenia, not to mention certain analysts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is always easy to make ‘correct’ analyses and statements in retrospect, and today there is no shortage of often contradictory statements, the main aim of which is to find or punish those responsible for the tragedy of 2020. I don’t want to get into that kind of debate, but I will try to set out a few considerations that have guided my activities and those of the Ministry’s senior diplomatic staff during this difficult period.
First of all, in our discourse, we generally distinguish between the 1st, 2nd (four days in 2016) and 3rd Karabakh wars. It is true that in 1994, following the indefinite ceasefire, military operations were halted, but the idea that the war was over was anchored in our collective consciousness. In my opinion, however, these were different stages in an inextricable war, because war is not just a battle on the battlefield. In this sense, 9 November 2020 merely put an end to military operations, and the war returned to the realm of diplomacy. Aware of the difficult situation in which the two Armenian states found themselves, we nevertheless believed that the tragedy we had experienced was not a death sentence. The appearance of our ministry with the attitude of an unconquerable person was precisely in line with this logic and not a manifestation of vital patriotism.
History is full of convincing examples where countries that had suffered defeat on the battlefield were able to recover thanks to astute diplomacy.
Secondly: among the traditional and important functions, the main and key role of diplomacy is to present correct assessments based on an in-depth analysis of various flows of open, closed and secret information, concerning developments in the security situation, and to make the appropriate recommendations arising from them. In no way do I wish to correct the fatal errors made by the decision-makers, but it must also be admitted that 27 September 2020 did not mature in a month or two. It is the culmination, just as the eruption of a volcano is preceded by fermentations and deep internal processes that go unnoticed and unseen.
That said, to find a way out of the current situation, we needed both to learn from our mistakes and, to adopt the right behaviour, to understand why the established status quo had collapsed. I would only add that small wars often precede, accompany or follow large wars and, in that sense, 2020 was a prelude to the imminent collapse of the balance of power in a broader sense.
Finally, one of the bitter lessons of 2020 was the realisation of our lack of strategic thinking or our complete failure. The experience of all wars proves that defeat, although extremely painful and precious, is the best school for strategists. Aware of the inadequacy of our capabilities, we also aimed to bring together valuable representatives of our community of experts and analysts under the aegis of the Ministry in order to develop a global professional capability for strategic analysis and planning. Developments prevented this idea from being implemented, but one of the main objectives of the newly created Pan-Armenian Council of Diplomats is to train and invest in institutional capacity of this kind.
We had drawn up a brief vision of a medium-term strategy, but the reality of the post-war period dictated the agenda, as we were forced to deal with a new crisis situation almost every week, looking for ways to strengthen the de-escalation processes while not crossing our ‘red lines’.
The effectiveness of diplomacy is severely limited in ongoing and prolonged crises, and this is precisely the situation we found ourselves in during the months following November 2020.
Secondly: among the traditional and important functions, the main and key role of diplomacy is to present correct assessments based on an in-depth analysis of various flows of open, closed and secret information, concerning developments in the security situation, and to make the appropriate recommendations arising from them. In no way do I wish to correct the fatal errors made by the decision-makers, but it must also be admitted that 27 September 2020 did not mature in a month or two. It is the culmination, just as the eruption of a volcano is preceded by fermentations and deep internal processes that go unnoticed and unseen.
That said, to find a way out of the current situation, we needed both to learn from our mistakes and, to adopt the right behaviour, to understand why the established status quo had collapsed. I would only add that small wars often precede, accompany or follow large wars and, in that sense, 2020 was a prelude to the imminent collapse of the balance of power in a broader sense.
We had drawn up a brief vision of a medium-term strategy, but the reality of the post-war period dictated the agenda, as we were forced to deal with a new crisis situation almost every week, looking for ways to strengthen the de-escalation processes while not crossing our ‘red lines’.
The effectiveness of diplomacy is severely limited in ongoing and prolonged crises, and this is precisely the situation we found ourselves in during the months following November 2020.
VH – You resigned as a team and then behaved quite decently, never saying anything bad about those you were working with and never saying anything for personal public relations reasons that might harm Armenia’s interests. Was this a joint decision or the behaviour of an educated diplomat?
AA – During this difficult period, the system really functioned as a single team. In such a difficult situation, the wrong decisions by one person could have disastrous consequences. It was therefore natural that decisions should be taken following collegial and multi-faceted discussions, involving not only the Ministry’s senior officials, but also our embassies, sometimes even former foreign ministers, as well as certain experts. It was generally accepted that the outcome of this serious examination of our 30-year-old institute would have an impact on the future of our state and the Armenian people. Nevertheless, when the question of the appropriateness of our work within the Ministry was raised, I must say in all sincerity that there was no discussion of submitting a joint resignation. Everyone made their own decision.
For each of us, there are circumstances that offer a good opportunity to get to know ourselves and others. These last few nightmare years have, in a sense, acted as an X-ray for each of us and, in a broader sense, for our society.
I don’t pretend to make an assessment, but I remain convinced that an Armenian diplomat must above all be the bearer of firm principles. The behaviour of many of my colleagues after they left the ministry was dictated by the unchanging position of state-building, which was never constrained by the authorities of the day.V.H. – After 9 November, there were two options. One was to stick to this document and try to protect Armenian interests as far as possible, the other was what this government did: it embarked on a Western adventure, following a miscalculation, it joined the international anti-Russian coalition, which led to the loss of Artsakh and the threat of the loss of Armenian statehood. At what point did it become clear to you that the government had adopted exactly this course and what, in your opinion, were the main mistakes made?
AA – You’re right, there were two ways, but my understanding is different. People who are more or less familiar with international relations, world history, diplomatic experience and the closely related phenomenon of war and peace know that wars are not fought to achieve victory on the battlefield, but to dictate the will of the adversary accordingly. We emerged victorious in 1994, but we were unable to impose our will definitively on our adversary.
At the end of this process, there will be no peace, only endless humiliations and painful unilateral concessions. It is clear that in the conditions of the collapse of the established world order, when international structures do not work and international law is more impotent than ever, the decisive factor in inter-state relations has become power politics. In this chaotic international situation, power once again gives birth to power, and the defeated and the weak must accept what the victors dictate to them. This is the undeniable reality of the cycle of wars. In such situations, the only way out is to create a counter-force to force, by forming a new balance of power and limiting the ever-greater ambitions of the adversary. By counterforce, I mean both our internal capabilities and, above all, the acquisition of natural and conjunctural allies through diplomacy and the combination of strategic interests. Forming alliances. We have already taken some promising first steps in this direction. In our environment, I am convinced that this is the only way to ensure stability and Armenian interests for a long time to come.
Clearly, such a scenario is complex and risky, but achievable through realistic strategic planning and precise calculations. The current Armenian authorities have preferred a different path, a so-called ‘realistic’ approach, but in reality they have accepted the will of the ‘victors’ through the path of least resistance, which has led to dangerous and intolerable demonstrations against our identity and our collective memory and, consequently, to unilateral concessions.
Our disagreements did not emerge at a specific moment, but as a result of our activities, it became clear that the ideas of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the political leaders concerning the management of the situation differ considerably. Ignoring current realities, while every country, large or small, pursues its own interests exclusively, putting values to one side, Armenia’s current authorities are looking for allies around ‘values’. As we have seen, at the right moment, the actors who carried and propagated the noble values of democracy and human rights were fast asleep and protecting neither Artsakh nor Armenia.
V.H. – Armenian-Russian relations: nowadays, many people travel to Moscow, meet with certain circles, and say the same things over and over: ‘together forever’, ‘long-standing brotherhood’, etc. The fact is that there is a serious problem in our relations today, which can be overcome by a literate understanding of the situation and mutual literate measures. The fact is that today there is a serious problem in our relations, which can be overcome by a literate understanding of the situation and mutual literate measures. It is clear that Armenia and Russia will have to make serious efforts to restore their relations. In your opinion, what literacy measures are needed in the new reality that the next government of Armenia and Russia should take?
A.A. – You quite rightly noted that we need to assess the situation correctly. The rich history of our relations and the diverse global agenda have led us to believe that this will always be the case. In the meantime, we have been destined to live through a period of radical transformation, which has also affected our relationships. The subject itself is very broad and contains different nuances, which are perhaps the subject of a separate study. In this format, I would like to focus on the security dimension, which is the most important in current conditions and from which everything else follows. In military and strategic theories, there is the concept of the ‘centre of gravity’, which designates a fundamental source of strength, balance and stability, a sort of backbone for the conduct of combat operations.
In war, adversaries strive to identify and target the enemy’s ‘centre of gravity’, which can pave the way to a decisive victory. In the First World War, for example, this centre was the Western Front, and in the Second World War, the Eastern Front. Furthermore, the ‘centre of gravity’ can be made up of major infrastructure nodes, capitals, leaders (Adolf Hitler) and, finally, allies. In my opinion, our ‘centre of gravity’ was the combination of our armed forces and the Armenian-Russian alliance. It is clear that, due to a combination of circumstances and processes, the most important link in our strategic deterrent, Armenian-Russian strategic cooperation, was neutralised, with a fatal impact on what happened next.
So we come to the logical question: why did this happen? Clearly, the problems are linked to incorrect or short-term situational calculations and to the revision of the priority of interests due to the change in the global situation. Finally, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of the shortcomings of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation (CSTO). It is absolutely clear to me that the Russian position on the Artsakh issue will certainly play an important role in our relations.
I suppose that the current situation cannot satisfy either Armenia or Russia. This period of instability and uncertainty will unfortunately last for a long time, and even the cessation of military operations in Ukraine will not bring peace, but will instead turn into a long-term destructive confrontation and new threats. Under these conditions, any country, even the most resource-rich, will need partners and allies more than ever, just as Armenia is in vital need of reliable allies. Therefore, at some point, the need to discuss the continuation and prospects of alliance relations without mutual accusations will mature, based on the commitment to ensure the security of mutual interests and to face challenges together. These are not mere words, but necessary preconditions for the adoption of bilateral strategic behaviour.
The joint formation of a reliable, mutually beneficial and effective modernised security architecture, based on coherent political and strategic visions, will guarantee long-term cooperation in the economic, humanitarian and other fields. Otherwise, some progressive areas of current cooperation will emerge under the rubble of expected and unexpected fluctuations in geopolitical upheavals.
VH – Let’s assume that Armenia has a new strong government. What are the main points of Armenia’s foreign policy after the reconstruction of the war?
A.A. – We need to be clear that any new government will be faced with the urgent imperative of overcoming numerous problems. Nevertheless, the most serious challenges will continue to threaten from the external front. I am convinced that in the years to come, it is the sphere of foreign policy that will be at the centre of our state’s defence. The main task in this respect will be the ability of the new government to return foreign policy, as a logical extension of domestic policy, to its natural course. Today, in my view, the situation has been turned upside down, and external factors and players are having a significant impact on our decisions.
Secondly, foreign policy must have a content that reflects our strategic objectives. In the current circumstances, it will be necessary to reformulate our medium- and long-term national interests and objectives in a realistic way, and to outline and plan the means of achieving them. Any foreign policy that is divorced from national interests not only turns into an imitative activity, but also makes the country’s defence capabilities vulnerable. Even the most profound diplomacy cannot function effectively if it does not have the understanding and support of the majority of society. The next authorities must ensure that the logic of foreign policy solutions is understood by the political world and the broad masses of society, while building a national consensus on our ‘red lines’.
Finally, we often record the incomplete state of our strategic thinking. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that the people who implement these ideas and objectives are individuals. The positive and negative experiences we have gained suggest that the presence of a strategic mindset is a necessary but not sufficient condition. It will only be effective if it is always accompanied by consistent behaviour on the part of decision-makers and those responsible for implementing decisions.
Main source: tert.am